Zimbabwe Situation: Stability trumps democracy for international stakeholders

sinethemba zonke
Aug 10, 2018
5 min read

Updated: Jan 16, 2019

Even before being held, the credibility of Zimbabwe’s 2018 poll was in question. This was as a result of a lack of trust towards the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) said to be heavily stuffed with Zanu-PF sympathisers. While open campaigning by opposition parties was allowed, the spectre of fear wielded by Zimbabwe’s state apparatus ensured an atmosphere of intimidation hung heavily over the pre-election period. Soldiers were reported to have bussed people to Zanu-PF rallies. The United Nations raised the alarm over reports of intimidation and violence in some rural areas. The spread of fake news also came into play with a rumour that fingerprints collected during registration would allow the government to trace whom people voted for. Even in the registration process, the Zanu-PF government still under the leadership of Zimbabwe had shifted the odds towards it through gerrymandering processes that put some urban areas into larger Zanu-PF leaning rural communities. Zanu-PF’s past behaviour and willingness to unleash brutal violence against its people had such an immense impact long before the elections that it was a strong signal for how the population, especially rural voters, were expected to behave.

With Emmerson Mnangagwa confirmed as the President-elect, strong proponents of democracy, free and fair elections in African and around the world will have to swallow the bitter pill that this outcome will be the status quo for the foreseeable future. The reaction by the losing Presidential candidate Nelson Chamisa and his allies has led to some civil unrest and protests, with the knee-jerk violent suppression by the state. This uprising will likely not last too long, as Mnangagwa’s offering remains a lot more salivating to international partners than that of the ageing Mugabe and unknown factor of Chamisa. The brutal suppression will likely continue but be contained, as the regime ensures it does not spread across the country.

Mnangagwa is the type of African strongman acceptable in the 21st century, espousing pragmatism over ideology. Since his ascension to power, he has taken a few key policy steps which have been welcomed by investors, rolling back much of the indigenisation policy and promising compensation for white farmers who lost land due to land invasions. Allowing international election observers from outside the continent for the first time in over a decade also highlights Mnangagwa plays an excellent game of public relations. The credibility of election observers has however been called into question, so their mere presence in a country does not create the environment for a free and fair election, as previous elections in Kenya and Zambia have shown. In Kenya, the country’s Supreme Court overturned an election result endorsed by international observers after finding that computers used in the elections were hacked. The Zambian polls ended up at the country’s Constitutional Court, on appeal by the opposition party, the UPND, but was thrown out on a technicality, as the court itself failed to resolve the matter within the mandated 14 days.

The purpose of observer missions is not one aimed at the people who are voting but instead partners around the world, international audiences which include a mix of investors and donors. Therefore, other strategic interests may come to play in how observers act. Even if observer missions are highly critical of elections, it does not appear that they are willing to go far enough in announcing an electoral result as illegitimate. In Uganda, the EU Observer mission refused to conclude on whether or not the election of Yoweri Museveni was free and fair, instead of telling people to read a report they drafted and come to their own conclusion. The EU observer mission acted in a similar vein with regards to the 2016 Zambian election, noting significant flaws in how the electoral process was held such as biased state media, campaign restrictions for opposition parties, but never going as far as condemning the electoral result. For Kenya, Uganda and Zambia there have been no consequences in their donor and investor relations with western democracies, therefore ensuring no incentive for change in the behaviour of incumbent governments, opening up a pathway for incremental growth in autocracy. Zambia’s President Edgar Lungu is currently on the path to run for a third term in 2021.

In the recent election held in Zimbabwe observers have maintained their historical role of legitimising questionable election outcomes. The African observer missions from the AU, SADC and COMESA endorsed the elections, mainly focusing on the fact that they were relatively peaceful and stuck to a legal framework. The EU has commended the peaceful manner and more open electoral environment, while noting the flaws such as an unequal playing field.

Observer missions from African bodies lack integrity mainly because these are groupings whose member countries include clear non-democratic states. The AU sent as head of its observer mission former Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, who received 100% of the vote in his country’s 2015 elections. Relationships between African governments, ruling parties and the notion of pan-African solidarity appear to be more important than the ideals of liberal democracy, free and fair elections; and therefore, the will of the people. The broader international community, particularly western democracies, seem to be following this trend.

As western governments and stakeholders face their own internal challenges with liberal democracy, they instead emphasise stability, especially where economic and the investment environment is concerned. The international community’s intentional blindness towards seriously flawed elections in Africa and evident authoritarianism in countries receiving donor aid such as Rwanda, does not bode well for the future of democracy in the continent.Historical there has been Western hypocrisy however it has now become more evident that the concern is relationships that meet their strategic needs, whether economic or geopolitical. This has been the case for decades in the Middle East with regimes like Saudi Arabia which has one of the worst human rights records. With the emergence and growing influence of China, whose geopolitical strategy has been “non-interference” in local politics (unless of course if one wants to befriend people like the Dali Lama); the West is starting let go of its pretenses about supporting democracy in the developing world. In Africa, our progress and gains towards genuinely liberal democracy are stalling and now will be under more significant threat. The rise of China and growing illiberal democracy in the West will ensure and secure the existence of Rwanda style regimes, as we are now sure to see in Zimbabwe.

Sinethemba Zonke is a political analyst and commentator